2 edition of Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales found in the catalog.
Published
1988
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass
.
Written in
Edition Notes
| Other titles | Unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales, reputation. |
| Statement | by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine |
| Series | Working paper / Department of Economics -- no. 490, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 490. |
| Contributions | Levine, David K., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 22 p. ; |
| Number of Pages | 22 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL24635585M |
| OCLC/WorldCa | 19403962 |
The reef fish Labroides dimidiatus interacts as a cleaner with other, larger reef fish, which is mutually beneficial. However, the cleaner fish has the option of feeding on the mucus of the client fish rather than eating the parasites. Because the cleaners prefer to eat the mucus, resisting this temptation and restricting their feeding to the parasites is a form of by: Definition. A real valued process X defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F,(F t) t ≥ 0,P) is called a semimartingale if it can be decomposed as = + where M is a local martingale and A is a càdlàg adapted process of locally bounded variation.. An R n-valued process X = (X 1,,X n) is a semimartingale if each of its components X i is a semimartingale.
Part of the Applications of Mathematics book series (SMAP, volume 5) Abstract Let (Ω, F, P) be a complete probability space, and let (F t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, be a nondecreasing family of sub-σ-algebras of F, augmented by sets from F of probability : R. S. Liptser, A. N. Shiryayev. Therefore Theorem extends Hoeffding’s inequality to the case of supermartingales with differences ξ i satisfying ξ i ≤ 1. The following remark establishes some relations among the well-known bounds of Hoeffding, Freedman, Bennett, Bernstein and De La Peña. Remark Cited by:
This book and the journal articles on which it is based pioneer a new branch of statistics. The reader who is unfamiliar with semimartingales can think of them as a generalization of supermartingales, where the latter are roughly a sequence of variables whose means increase and such that each variable is bigger than its conditional mean (a conditional mean is the mean of one thing or variable 5/5(1). History. Originally, martingale referred to a class of betting strategies that was popular in 18th-century France. The simplest of these strategies was designed for a game in which the gambler wins their stake if a coin comes up heads and loses it if the coin comes up tails. The strategy had the gambler double their bet after every loss so that the first win would recover all previous losses.
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Workingpaper department ofeconomics "iy^ryf'a^op^Mj*'f-:rz!^y7tym}i--"'''^ Reputation,UnobservedStrategies, andActiveSuoermartingales by Number DrewFudenberg and March massachusetts instituteof technology 50memorialdrive Cambridge,mass texts All Books All Texts latest This Just In Smithsonian Libraries FEDLINK (US) Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales Item Preview remove-circle Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales by Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, Pages: Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales.
Author & abstract; Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papersMassachusetts Institute of Technology Martin, "Reputation Effects in Dynamic Games," Economic Research Papers Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales her consumption and 8 A key result in the reputation literature in game theory provides a foundation for our formulation.
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales By Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine Publisher: Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyAuthor: Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales by Drew Fudenberg & David K.
Levine; Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed. by Fudenberg, D. Unobserved punishment supports cooperation by Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak.
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," (). Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, L ().
The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading," (). The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading in the Stock Market," Cited by: Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics View citations (4) Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics View citations (16).
Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed Article (PDF Available) in Review of Economic Studies 59(3) February with Reads How we measure 'reads'. Let Active Supermartingales We now demonstrate Theoremstated in the previous section, that it is unlikely that forecasts of y are wrong in many periods.
Downloadable. The solution of a reputational equilibrium is given for a class of linear, quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. Although there is imperfect monitoring, a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent, there is no sudden switch in agents' strategies; a common feature of reputation : Martin Cripps.
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales,” (). Sticky Prices in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Investigation of (s,S) ().Author: Paul Heidhues and Botond Köszegi. In Chapter 24 we defined a martingale via an equality for certain conditional expectations.
If we replace that equality with an inequality we obtain super-martingales and submartingales. Once again (Author: Jean Jacod, Philip Protter. The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing.
Book. Full-text available. Feb ; Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales. The Significance Of Corporate Reputation Management In The Public Sector: A Case Study Of National Social Security Authority (NASSA) Article (PDF Available) May with 2, Reads How we Author: Gerald Munyoro.
Jump to Journal Articles Books Edited books Chapters Software Items Working Papers Imitation Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine ; Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K.
Levine View citations (2) Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules. " Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papersMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, " Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol.
27(2), pagesAugust. Affiliations Washington University in St. Louis → Department of Economics (weight: 30%). website; location: St. Louis, Missouri (United States) European University Institute → Department of Economics (weight: 30%).
website. "Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papersMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. Slade, Margaret E., " Sticky prices in a dynamic oligopoly: An investigation of (s,S) thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol.
17(4), pagesMay. A CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR NON NEGATIVE ALMOST SUPERMARTINGALES AND SOME APPLICATIONS* H. Robbins and D. Siegmund Columbia University 1.
Introduction and Summary The purpose of this paper is to give a unified treatment of a number of almost sure convergence theorems by exploiting the fact that the processes involved possess a common "almost supermartingale'1 Cited by:. This paper studies the credibility of policy announcements in macroeconomics.
This issue is exemplified by the problem of monetary policy design in light of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
In contrast to reputational models of the repeated games literature, the credibility problem between the central bank and the private sector, which results from the policymaker's temptation to Cited by: 2.sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt over the book value of total assets (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, ).
Market value is usually based on expected cash flows and risks.This paper compares two methods of prediction with expert advice, the Aggregating Algorithm and the Defensive Forecasting, in two different settings.
The first setting is traditional, with a countable number of experts and a finite number of by: 3.
